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Abstract
The article analyzes the complex and problematic relationship between populist in-
surgency and the return of the class struggle. The ‘populist moment’ is interpreted as a 
counter-movement with respect to the disruptive social results of the thirty-year period 
of neo-liberal globalization and as an obligatory passage, in the current historical con-
juncture, to reactivate the possibility of a distributive conflict in a practicable political 
space, that of the National State. After the initial onset, however, populism is struc-
turally inadequate, due to its very logic of functioning, to give form to a class struggle 
anchored in the pluralism of social interests and to resist the risk of reactionary drifts 
and colonization from above by the dominant economic forces.
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza la compleja y problemática relación entre insurgencia popu-
lista y el retorno de la lucha de clases. El “momento populista” es interpretado como 
un contra movimiento con relación a los resultados sociales disruptivos del periodo 
de treinta años de globalización neoliberal y como un pasaje obligatorio, en la actual 
coyuntura histórica, para re activar la posibilidad de un conflicto redistributivo en una 
1. Reception date: 4 th Genuary 2019; acceptance date: 6 th February 2019. This article is the result of research activities 
held at the Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno.
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esfera política práctica, la del Estado nación. Sin embargo, despúes del momento inicial, 
el populismo se muestra estructuralmente inadecuado para dar forma a una lucha de 
clases anclada en el pluralismo de los intereses sociales y para resistir el riesgo de cam-
bios reaccionarias y de colonización desde arriba, por parte de las fuerzas económicas 
dominantes, debido a su propia lógica de funcionamiento.
Palabras clave
Populismo, lucha de clases, desglobalización, ley, Estado nación.
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After the great crisis: populism as the ‘return of the repressed’
The class struggle is one of the different aspects of the (late) political modernity 
that the thirty-year period of neo-liberal globalization has tried to file away definitively. 
Mainstream narrative has not only declared obsolescence, but also the uselessness of the 
traditional distributive and political conflict between different social classes in the new 
global world developed since the Eighties of the last century. Just like the National State, 
political sovereignty and legal order based on legislative law, even class struggle has 
been described as an element belonging to an era that is coming to an end, that of polit-
ical modernity opened by the French Revolution and culminating in the ‘thirty glorious 
years’ of the second post-war period: all elements that could no longer play a primary or 
significant role in the post-modern era of deployed globalization.
When the global economic crisis, which began in 2007-8, undermined the consen-
sus of this neo-liberal narrative, which until then was almost unchallenged, it gradually 
appeared more evident as those that were defined with some reason the ‘thirty inglo-
rious years’, following the ‘thirty glorious years’ of the Keynesian compromise between 
capital and labour, led to the working classes’ dispossession of self-awareness2, even be-
fore the functionality of the instruments of struggle used during the previous century: 
unions, parties, representative institutions.
The transforming action of neo-liberal hegemony has not only been exercised on 
economic and political terrain, but has acted on a deeper, anthropological level, col-
onizing desires, expectations, representations of self, feelings of individuals beyond 
their class membership3. The neo-liberal imagination has thus deconstructed the old 
social affiliations and loyalties in an even more corrosive way than the productive and 
technological transformations that have invested the sphere of work. The intrinsical-
ly individualistic conformation of this imaginary has deployed a destructuring action 
with respect to sentiments of collective belonging of a political, trade union and class 
nature. Consumption, enjoyment, self-affirmation and even self-entrepreneurship have 
gradually eroded the symbolic and axiological centrality of work. The latter has been 
increasingly represented as a residue, an encumbrance that has not yet been completely 
overcome, the persistence of an era that neo-liberal globalization would have definitive-
ly concluded with its progress.
2. The indispensability of the element of ‘self-consciousness’ as a condition for a social class to perform a significant histo-
rical-political function was also emphasized by non-Marxist scholars. For example, see Aron, 1964.
3. Among the many works on the subject, see, in particular, Dardot & Laval, 2009.
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In the neo-liberal imaginary the marginalization of work has been the premise of 
its depoliticization, that is, of the fact that it ceased to act as the primary foundation of 
class belonging and of political activity. The territorial uprooting, which also work has 
suffered, contributed to this process. This uprooting had a double dimension. The first 
was represented by the fragmentation of production processes and by the phenomena 
of reduction and delocalization of industrial factory work, the central element of the 
political-trade union weight and of the self-consciousness of the working class in the 
previous phase. The second was determined by the emptying of the national political 
community as a primary place for the organization and class struggle4. Even the politi-
cal and trade union representatives of the working classes have introjected the narration 
of the decline of the national State as an arena and arbiter of distributive conflict, based 
on the intangibility of the neo-liberal dogma of the absolute freedom of movement of 
capital, goods and services (to which workforce is added in the European Union of the 
‘four freedoms of movement’).
In this dimension of deployed globality, relieved of the constraints and regulatory 
barriers of national legal systems and placed as far as possible away from elements of 
interference and regulation of democratic political powers, finance capital affirms its 
expansive und unchallenged power, changing radically to its own advantage the balance 
of power with work5. The famous phrase of one of the greatest exponents of the global 
financial establishment, Warren Buffet, according to which the class struggle had not 
ceased at all, but was simply swept up by the capitalists, well describes the absence of 
political, juridical, cultural, ideological limits, that marked the predominance of capital 
over labour during neo-liberal globalization. It is now a recognized fact that this also 
depended on the loss, after the collapse of real socialism, of any geopolitical counter-
weight to Western capitalism.
The great financial crisis can be interpreted as the heterogenesis of the intents of 
this immeasurable victory -without more internal and external constraints- of financial 
capitalism on its class opponent: labour. The drastic reduction of the wages share with 
respect to the total wealth, the total disconnection between the growth of labour pro-
ductivity and stagnation, or even reduction of wages, the exponential growth of private 
debt to support consumption, and the deterioration of public welfare are revealed, at 
at the same time, as the effect of this overwhelming victory of capital and the cause of 
4. For a specific analysis of the effects of the emptying of the political-State regulation on the functioning of the capitalist 
system, see, among others, Gallino, 2011; Leon, 2014.
5. Among the most recent works, for a critical analysis of the effects of financial globalization on the legal field, see Ferra-
rese, 2017. On the more strictly political-economic implications see Rodrik, 2017.
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the loss of balance of the major capitalist economies6. It should be noted that these eco-
nomic transformations, so profound and ‘disorderly’ for to the social balance achieved 
in the decades of the ‘Keynesian compromise’, have not found a restraining force in law, 
nor in the common law derivation, nor in that of civil law. The national legal systems, 
weakened in their political-territorial legitimacy and attracted by the sirens of a legal 
cosmopolitanism and a global constitutionalism trusting in the emancipatory and pro-
gressive potentialities of the wave of globalization, were permeated by the devices of 
neo-liberal economic governance, genetically allergic to the recognition of a plurality of 
objectively conflicting interests.
The colonization of legal and representative systems by neo-liberal orthodoxy, which 
denies the legitimacy of the distributive conflict between divergent interests, determines 
a growing inability of the liberal-democratic order to recognize and channel into its 
mechanisms an increasing share of social demands. The populist insurgency, which in 
various forms crosses the West since the outbreak of the economic crisis, is above all 
the consequence of this situation. The occlusion of the legal, political and represen-
tative channels that allowed the distributive conflict between different social interests 
to develop within the liberal-democratic systems of the nation-States makes the class 
struggle re-emerge with the strength and the unruliness of a sort of ‘return of the re-
pressed’. Populism thus reconfigures the class struggle as an insurgency from the bot-
tom stripped of the previous representative forms, strongly polarized and tendentially 
refractory to any form of political mediation in the traditional sense.
The populist counter-movement and its contradictions
At this point, we bump into the problem of the complex, unstable and contradictory 
relationship between populist insurgency and the return of the class struggle, which 
takes place in a socio-psychological context still dominated by the neo-liberal imag-
ination, in which class consciousness is not reconstituted with its traditional link to 
the dimension of labour. This change in social psychology has no less impact than the 
dispersion and pulverization of forms and types of work in an economy increasingly 
dominated by services and the digital world. The processes of political subjectification 
become even more irreducible to a sociological nomenclature of the classes, if they were 
6. On these phenomena and on their internal connection, see, in particular, Streeck, 2017.
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mechanically in the previous phase. The theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe 
captures here a crucial point in the transformation of contemporary politics and in the 
difficulties of the less aware forms of Marxist analysis of social conflict7. In a condition 
characterised by an increased cultural pluralism, a weakening of feelings of belonging 
to territorial and social communities and a tendency towards increasingly driven pro-
cesses of individualization, the ‘people’, i.e. the subject of collective political action, must 
be constructed artificially. Its capacity for action, its recognition in unifying battles and 
in a community of destiny are not given in the objectivity of social reality, but must be 
produced by a political design capable of linking together only different and prima facie 
potentially even among them conflicting instances.
The consequence of this artificial construction of the collective political subject - 
and this is an element that perhaps does not receive all the necessary consideration by 
Laclau and Mouffe- is that its identity bond inevitably becomes cultural rather than so-
cio-economic. A confirmation of this shift of political dynamics in the era of neo-liberal 
hegemony also comes from the fact that, in the decades preceding the global economic 
crisis, the traditional right/left axis was re-articulated to a largely prevalent extent on the 
identity-cultural dimension, largely losing the capability to describe and represent the 
traditional distributive conflict between capital and labour. The conservative/progressive 
dichotomy replaces the liberal/socialist dichotomy, substantially disabled by the affirma-
tion of the dictatorship of the notorious ‘TINA’ (There Is No Alternative) of Thatcher’s 
ancestry in the field of economic policies. The outcome of this re-semantization of the 
right-left dialectic is that the working classes are deprived of political representation 
directly linked to their material interests. In European and Western political left, pre-
vails what Nancy Fraser calls a «progressiv Neo-liberalism» (Brenner & Fraser, 2017), 
charachterized by the conjunction of a very open and advanced individualism in the 
field of civil and freedom rights with a substantially liberalist and anti Keynesian ap-
proach in the economic-social field.
The ‘populist moment’ is above all the effect of a historical counter-movement 
against the long hegemonic phase of this neo-liberal individualism, which marked the 
decades before the global crisis. The laceration of every protective fabric in cultural 
and economic terms produced by the ascending phase of globalization leads to a sort 
of backlash, a violent compensatory reaction, which translates into a new need for be-
longing, community, identity, social bond. This happens without the mediations and 
7. For the more detailed exposition of this theory and its philosophical assumptions, see Laclau, 2005.
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intermediate structures on which the liberal-democratic order is founded. On the con-
trary this process takes place in a reactive and immediate way, searching for areas of 
homogeneity and mutual recognition as close and as narrow as possible. The new forms 
of digital communication and social networks, rather than diluting their memberships 
in a new global horizontality capable of dissolving every cultural boundary (as expected 
from a certain rhetoric of globalization), lead and emphasize this search for ‘identity 
niches’, built in a strongly agonistic way with respect to the ‘strangers’.
Therefore the populist moment brings the risk of a pathological drift of the post-cri-
sis shift of the Zeitgeist of the West towards a more communal dimension, triggered by 
the sense of anomie and uprooting produced by the full unfolding of liberal individu-
alism and the disruptive effects of contemporary financial capitalism. Populism trig-
gers dynamics that can push the pendulum towards an opposite and specular polarity 
with respect to the individualistic atomism of the previous phase: from the refusal of 
the concept of society itself («society does not exist, individuals exist», according to a 
liberal thought line, which from the Austrian School of Economics comes up to Mar-
garet Thatcher) to the risk of a return to a community intended for organic totality, far 
beyond the «anti-essentialist» artificiality of the «chain of equivalences» described by 
Laclau and Mouffe8. This is also revealed by the return of the national dimension as the 
primary field of political conflict. This momentum, patently anthitetical to the de-ter-
ritorialization of politics and law, holds the potential for a revitalization of democratic 
participation and popular sovereignty, but at the same time it brings the risk of a re-
gressive and exclusive re-configuration of the national community, in which populism 
assumes a xenophobic fold and the social articulation of conflict is replaced by an appeal 
to the homogeneity and innocence of the original community, threatened by an external 
enemy whose otherness is depicted as irreducible.
The structural heterogeneity between populist insurgency and 
class struggle
The terrain of political conflict in the current phase of de-globalization, howev-
er, is the one designed by the populist insurgency, which in this historical bend is 
8. The outcome of this populist dynamic is truly paradoxical, if we consider that, albeit in a profoundly different theoretical 
sense from the Thatcherian one, the thesis that «society does not exist» is also the basis of the «post-Marxist» and «anti-es-
sentialist» theoretical turn that Laclau and Mouffe accomplished in the mid-Eighties. See Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 114.
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redesigning the language and political grammar of all the forces in the field, sub-
jecting to a strong tension the usual functioning dynamics of the liberal-democratic 
systems. As a result, in the current historical conjuncture the resumption of the 
class struggle can only pass initially through the narrow path of populism. However, 
this should not lead to the theoretical error of identifying populist insurgency and 
class struggle. Populism is the obligatory step to reactivate the distributive conflict, 
but it cannot be structurally thought of as the functional substitute for the construc-
tion of ‘historical-social blocks’. This element is indispensable for transforming the 
populist insurgency into a class struggle endowed with coherence, continuity and 
strategic vision9. The reason lies in the fact that the populist mechanism of consen-
sus building, after the initial onset, appears inadequate to the direction of a strategic 
action, anchored to concrete and determined social interests, capable of an actual 
transformation of forces and power relations within a political and social order.
According to the conception of Laclau and Mouffe, «anti-essentialism» becomes a 
sort of essence of populism and its differential characteristics with respect to other forms 
of political action. However, the artificial and discursive character of the construction of 
the people is exposed to the risk of eliminating the economic-social roots of collective 
belonging and political conflict. The ‘people’, understood as a constructivist outcome 
of a «chain of equivalences» drawn up on the basis of a political design, is exposed to 
various forms of simplification and reductionism. In this sense the «anti-essentialism» 
is exposed to many traps, if we imagine the populist device as the way to reactivate a 
distributive conflict in which the interests of the subaltern classes return to have an 
effective weight. The first and most evident of this traps is a reactoinary reading of the 
populist discourse, based on the claim of an original and uncontaminated homogeneity 
of the people and on the removal of the conflictual pluralism of the economic-social 
interests that cross it.
On the other hand, we can say – to misquote the well-known joke attributed to 
Gioacchino Rossini about the work of a young composer– that something true and 
something new lies in the «anti-essentialist» twist of the populist theory, but what is true 
is not new and what is new is not true10. The intrinsically political and ‘hegemonic’ char-
acter of the process of building a party and its people is widely explored in the Marxism 
of Antonio Gramsci11, as demonstrated on the historical-political ground, to take the 
9. For an analytical perspective of populism that does not exclude this possibility, see Formenti, 2016.
10. For an earlier and more problematic position of the same Laclau with respect to this «anti-essentialist» twist, even if 
already not crushed on a mechanical class reductionism, see Laclau, 1977.
11. For an analysis of the question of egemony in the Gramscian Quaderni with respect to the function of law, see Prete-
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example of Italy, by the awareness of the leading group of the post-war PCI, starting 
from Togliatti, that the party-subject certainly could not be reduced to a mere «class 
nomenclature». The wisest forms of historical materialism have always had the non-me-
chanical relationship between social position and political representation in mind. And 
yet, without the persistence of a social anchorage, without a nucleus of ‘essentialism’, 
the construction of a ‘chain of equivalences’ between different instances of struggle and 
claim is more exposed to the risk of forms of ‘ethnicist’ reductionism, which character-
ize reactionary populism, or, on the other hand, colonization and hetero-direction by 
dominant economic interests.
This risk is even accentuated in a situation like the current one, marked by a more 
communitarian Zeitgeist compared to the ascending phase of neo-liberal globalization. 
It has been said that, from this point of view, the populist insurgency marks a sort of 
‘historical-spiritual’ counter-movement, particularly evident with respect to the out-
comes of the conjunction between the individualistic and libertarian roots of the youth 
protest movements of the sixties and seventies of the last century and the «spirit of 
the new capitalism», according to the category of Weberian ancestryb (reworked by 
Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999). From this point of view, it is necessary to recognize the 
inevitability of the populist moment as a necessary step to question the consensus, un-
challenged in the West up to the global economic crisis, of the neo-liberal order and to 
reopen a space of conflict practicable by social and ideological interests distinct from 
those of financial capital. At the same time, and back to the basic point, in the medi-
um-long term populism is inadequate to give a stable political form to the dynamics of 
the class struggle. The reduction of political conflict to binary schemes such as people vs. 
elite or low vs. high can not structure a lasting and democratic dialectic between diver-
gent social economic interests, among which it is necessary to build spaces of conflict 
and at the same time of mutual recognition and temporary mediation.
Populist disintermediation and the risk of colonization from above
This crucial aspect is closely linked to the device of disintermediation between 
political leadership and the people, on which the populist discourse is based. The po-
litical and social intermediate bodies, under pressure forthe individualizing atomism 
rossi, 2018. On the role of law in the Gramscian articulation of the nexus ‘structure-superstructure’ see also, among recent 
works, Gazzolo, 2018.
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of neo-liberal order, are emptied of their residual resources of mobilization and cir-
cumvented by the populist dynamic, in itself incompatible with the recognition of 
their function. The deactivation of intermediate bodies is one of the elements that 
helps to blow up the coexistence, the intersection and the balance between social 
legitimacy and moral legitimization of political conflict in populist discourse. This 
articulation is broken because the populist construction of the ‘we’ leads to a radical 
delegitimization of reasons and interests of excluded and averse side of society. The 
impending risk is a radical polarization of the friend-enemy clash on a field of moral 
and ‘existential’ delegitimization of the Other, rather than on the field of the recog-
nition of an interests divergence to be faced and composed. The populist discourse is 
exposed to the slipping into a sort of ‘moralistic’ other TINA, opposite and specular 
to the dictatorship of the neo-liberal imaginary and the politically correct, which had 
marked the previous phase.
On one hand this moral radicalization of conflict undermines the capability of pop-
ulism to transform social and economic relations; on the other, it increases the risk of 
colonization from the top of the populist insurgency. The articulation of the «chain of 
equivalences» can be dominated by instances, strategically fed by powerful financial 
and media conditioning centers, which redefine the hierarchy of the objectives of the 
conflict on an axis that does not exactly coincide with the primary interests of the lower 
classes, which also constitute the basis of primary accumulation and the indispensable 
initial propellant of the populist dynamics12.
The risk of a colonization from above of this people vs elite dynamic is exemplified 
by the way in which its charge of contestation has often been diverted from its natural 
target, the global economic-financial class with its substantial class interests, and con-
verted into a generic as well as strong ‘anti-political’ sentiment, based on the indistinct 
rejection of the political ruling classes and on the indignation for the functioning costs 
of representative democracy. The ‘anti-political’ torsion of populism has identified the 
political parties and sometimes even the unions as the target of a destructive criticism, 
aimed not at stimulating a renewal of their function and organization, but at denying 
their usefulness in the age of disintermediate democracy. The problem is that this denial 
of the role of intermediate bodies is singularly convergent with one of the instances car-
ried out with greater determination by the last decades neo-liberal offensive.
12. For the thesis of the non-extraneousness of the populist moment to the fundamental devices of neo-liberal hegemony, 
see, in particular, Bazzicalupo, 2014.
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In this case the colonization from the top of the populist insurgency produces a 
quite paradoxical effect: to reinforce a project of social and political atomization, in 
accordance with one of the fundamental aims of neo-liberal globalization, the main 
opponent against whom the populist insurgency was born. The big capital doesn’t need 
political parties or public financing to enforce its demands on public institutions. On 
the contrary, it does not miss the opportunity to re-direct the populist wave against an-
other elite, the political one. In this way, as long as this ‘colonizing populism from above’ 
strategy work, capitalist classes obtain two significant achievements: to keep their ma-
terial class interests safe, away from the battlefront, and make the political class weaker, 
i.e. poorer in both material resources and legitimacy, and therefore more in need of 
their economic and media support, with everything that follows.
This destructuring of the intermediate bodies, which populism often leads to, takes 
us to the fact that in many contexts, in the current situation, the populist way is the last 
and only one to reactivate a sort of social conflict not restricted to single topics or pro-
tests. But still, it is patent that it is inadequate to restore subjectivity and political auton-
omy for the working class in a more stable and effective configuration. In this sense, the 
«anti-essentialism» inherent in the construction of populist discourse shows its main 
lack: it can not identify a core of shared interests and convictions which is essential for 
establishing a political feeling of belonging to a collective battle in lasting and resistant 
terms. The people, the fruit of the purely discursive construction of a «chain of equiva-
lences», seems to be a much more unstable, colonizable and fragile political subject than 
the class. Without the reactivation of the class as political subjectivity, the world of work 
is thus deprived of an effective instrument to counteract its shattering, marginalization 
and subordination in the neo-liberal order, of which the populist insurgency fails to 
question the fundamental structures of economic domination.
De-globalization, class struggle and national State
Nonetheless in a first phase the populist reaction to the neo-liberal order manag-
es to produce the re-politicization of the national public space. The populist moment 
reconstructs a potentially productive nexus between class struggle and State-institu-
tion, re-delimiting a practicable area of conflict and also giving a political dimension to 
the process of de-globalization that started economically after the great crisis in 2008. 
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At this point we come across a crucial theme that has passed through theoretical re-
flection and political discussion in the Marxist sphere: the relationship between class 
struggle and the function of the national State. It is a strongly debated issue, from which 
profoundly different interpretations13 and political translations of Marxism have been 
derived. Without entering into a Marxist tradition’s internal interpretative controversy, 
if we look at the history of the twentieth century, it is nevertheless hard to deny that 
the control or at least a certain degree of State power conditioning was the condition 
which allowed the distributive conflict to develop with the historically more favorable 
outcome for the working classes.
Since the Eighties, the neo-liberal narrative of the end of the regulatory function of 
the State in the globalized world is accepted by growing sectors of political and trade 
union forces representing the working classes. It has also happened that a part of the left 
of Marxist inspiration has been convinced that globalization created new possibilities 
for conflict and emancipation and that it was opening up the field to a more fruitful and 
promising global class struggle, completely unrelated to national belonging and from 
the residual regulatory abilities of State sovereignties. It was obviously a pious illusion, 
against which during the thirty years of neo-liberal globalization the real history of the 
change in the balance of power between classes has pronounced its «harsh replies», in 
the words of Norberto Bobbio about the collapse of real socialism. The States have not 
disappeared and a globality rich in emancipatory potentialities has not been deployed 
for the new «multitudes» that should have taken the place of the national working class-
es. Instead, the political direction of the States has been just colonized, with increasingly 
weak resistance, by the interests of transnational financial capital, unchained from ‘sov-
ereign’ control and capable, thanks to, among other things, its freedom of movement, of 
conditioning national political powers with effectiveness and pervasiveness far greater 
than the previous phase. The idea that workers and migrants could exploit the freedom 
of movement and the permeability of borders in an equally or more advantageous way 
than financial capital served to write books that, in the triumphant phase of neo-lib-
eral globalization, experienced a certain editorial success14 (not inexplicable given the 
cultural directives of the time…), but showed a very problematic adherence, to say the 
13. For a critique of the Marxist doctrine of the State, which would have acted historically as a weakening factor in the 
struggle of the working class against capital, see recently Pivetti, 2017. Instead, for a strong emphasis on the centrality of 
the national issue in the Marxist-Leninist tradition and the political impotence of the post-‘68 Western maxism strands, 
which have lost this awareness, see Losurdo, 2015, pp. 146 ss. From a Marxist perspective, for an analysis of the evolutio-
nary phases of modern capitalism in relation to the transformation of the forms of State political power and the impact of 
the class struggle, see, above all, Arrighi, 2014.
14. The paradigmatic case is represented by Hardt & Negri, 2000.
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least, to the empirical reality and to the concrete evolution of the power relations be-
tween classes.
Populism offers the opportunity to re-politicize a space, the national one, potentially 
viable for the reopening of the distributive conflict. But it also opens, as has been said, 
the possibility of a declination of this space in terms of compact block, of organic total-
ity, with opposite and specular results to those of the atomization produced by neo-lib-
eral hegemony. Both paradigms are substantially incompatible with the structuring of 
a distributive conflict socially anchored and recognized on the political-institutional 
level. The device of neo-liberal atomization inhibits the class struggle because it pre-
vents the consolidation of feelings of collective belonging and communities of interests; 
the model of organic totality because it does not recognize and legitimize the irreducible 
and conflicting pluralism of the interests that run through society, outside the binary 
framework founded on the contrast between a restricted elite and the vast majority, the 
‘healthy’ part of the social body, represented as a bearer of common interests.
After the social and political effects of the great crisis, the reactivation of a regulated 
and vital class struggle can now be recognized as a fundamental requirement for west-
ern democracies and for their possible regeneration. The resumption of the class strug-
gle is thus faced with the need to use the populist moment without being absorbed and 
neutralized by its logic: which means, for example, using the gap opened by populism to 
reactivate the possible transformative function of national popular sovereignty in a pro-
gressive and emancipatory sense, avoiding the risk of being sucked into the whirlpools 
of ‘ethnicist’ and reactionary nationalism. Class struggle implies a not unidimensional 
or organic concept of political community. It’s rather intrinsically pluralist, and there-
fore open to internal conflict and integration through successive steps and necessarily 
unstable balancing.
The class struggle and the re-politicization of law
The class struggle shows elements of tension even with a certain declination of the 
concept of ‘common good’ or with an idea of law founded on conformity to ‘moral 
principles of justice’. A constitutionalism that sets the institutional framework and the 
perimeter of shared ethical-political convictions, within which social and democratic 
dialectics can develop, is a support to a regulated and productive distributive conflict. 
An «irenical» (Luciani, 2006) or global constitutionalism, which cuts the political root 
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of law and assigns its legitimacy to a jurisdictional ‘ethicalization’ (which is increasingly 
assigned to the prevalence of transnational courts that are hardly permeable to the de-
mands of the economically weaker and less dynamic part of society), constitutes instead 
an obstacle and a potential factor of ideological delegitimization for a class struggle 
aimed at substantially modifying economic power relations and their political-juridical 
projection15.
If we think about, for example, a conception of law such as that of Ronald Dworkin, 
which has exercised a considerable influence on a large part of contemporary neo-con-
stitutionalism, it is difficult to imagine how a conception of the class struggle as a dy-
namic process, that aims to continually shift the juridical equilibrium in society, can 
coexist with an idea of law founded on the thesis of «one-right answer» (Dworkin, 1985, 
pp. 119 ss.), which the judge would be responsible for identifying from time to time, on 
the basis of a unitary and coherent corpus of overarching principles with respect to the 
legislative rules. At the same time, the class struggle is challengend in its crucial func-
tion for the democratic dialectic and process by conceptions which tend to accentuate 
the purely deliberative and discursive side of the latter, essentially trying to deny the ir-
reducibly ‘agonistic’ root of politics and, in particular, of democratic politics16. The idea 
that organizing public discourse in the most rational, transparent and informed way can 
overcome disagreement and conflict carries with it the risk of denying the conflicting 
existence of a plurality of economic interests and the consequent implicit delegitimi-
zation of those among them that are more divergent from the mainstream consensus 
which dominates the debate in the public sphere.
From this point of view, the populist moment offers the trigger for a re-politiciza-
tion of the discourse on liberal democracy and law with respect to the prevailing po-
litical-juridical conceptions during the thirty years of neo-liberal globalization. The 
populist insurgency has the merit of unmasking the pretense of neutralization pro-
moted by a global right that is undocked by political mediation and by amministrative 
and territorial specificity. But populism, after the initial onset, fails to structure the 
economic-social dimension of the conflict and to guarantee the political-juridical le-
gitimacy of the complex plurality of interests in the field, not reducible to the dichot-
omy low vs. high. The anti-establishment discursive rhetoric, which translates into the 
15. On the difference between the historicistic conception of class struggle and a static theory of rights on liberal basis, see 
recently Galli, 2018, pp. 126 ss.
16. See on this point, also for an explicit theoretical controversy with Rawls and Habermas, Mouffe, 2005, 2018. For a more 
articulated reconstruction of the relationship between conflict, legitimacy and hegemony in late political modernity, see 
Preterossi, 2015, in a critical dialogue with the theses of Laclau and Mouffe.
image of 99% of the society fighting against 1%, after the healthy initial shock to the 
ideological dictatorship of the neo-liberal order, risks slipping into a new organicism 
of the ‘common good’. Low vs. high reductionism and the difficulty of recognizing 
and articulating the pluralism of internal interests even to 99% of society open the 
way to the temptation to morally or ‘organicistically’ legitimate (the natural unity of 
the ‘healthy’ part of society) a new political-juridical order, with all the possible reac-
tionary or regressive risks deriving from it. And with the paradox that the weakening 
of the economic-social root in the populist construction of the people - the real poi-
soned fruit of the «anti-essentialism» - leads to morally legitimize a new equilibrium 
that, if analyzed in its concrete contents and in the real power relations it preserves, 
it does not appear so distant and revolutionary with respect to the neo-liberal order 
against which populism had arisen.
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